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Water, Water, NoWhere: adaptiNg Water 
rights for a ChaNgiNg Climate
Caleb Hall*
I. IntroductIon
Water supply is increasingly threatened by climate change throughout the West, especially in California. Although California has started regulating ground-
water use, the state’s current efforts are not likely sufficient 
to adapt to an ever warming climate.1 California’s latest legal 
efforts are needed, but are lacking because “it will take years to 
craft and implement the management plans, the full effect of the 
regulations — the recovery of…over-pumped basins — won’t be 
felt until at least 2040.”2
Meanwhile, recent climate change research predicts that 
evapotranspiration will increase seven percent in the immedi-
ate future.3 By 2050, the 
median snowpack could 
be one-third smaller 
than historical medians, 
and by 2100 it could be 
two-thirds smaller.4 Such 
drastic losses in snowmelt 
will yield less runoff to 
refill reservoirs leading to 
more frequent droughts. 
Other statistics show that 
by 2100, there may only be a ten percent chance that California’s 
snowpack will equal today’s average accumulation.5
Considering the dire straits of California’s water supply, cur-
rent legal responses to droughts in the West will fail to respond 
to worsening droughts because western water law is premised 
on the assumption that current water use can be maintained.6 
However, in an unstable climate, that assumption is no longer 
valid.7 Under prior appropriation, water rights are maintained as 
long as water use is deemed “beneficial.”8 Although “beneficial 
use” is considered through the rate and amount of water used, 
such analysis is still limited to categorical definitions without 
contextual consideration.9 California and the western United 
States must reconsider the “beneficial use” requirement to adapt 
to climate change as such treatment is not sustainable in a time 
of ever-increasing droughts.
This Article begins with an explanation of California’s cur-
rent water use, how the current drought threatens water use, and 
how climate change will ensure more disastrous drought. A his-
tory of development of western water law is offered to describe 
the current situation. This leads to a discussion of three spec-
trums of western water law: California’s recognizance of both 
riparian and prior appropriation, Colorado’s, recognizance of 
only prior appropriation, and Kansas’ adoption of several unique 
legal mechanisms to address drought. The Article concludes by 
urging that current western water law is not sufficiently prospec-
tive for more frequent droughts, but California water law can 
shift into a temporal, circumstance-oriented requirement if it 
changes from its current static “beneficial use” requirement. 
II. the Golden, unsustaInable state
California, the Golden State, is aptly named because of 
its historic gold resources that precipitated the mass migration 
towards the American West.10 In addition to gold, California also 
has enticing natural splendor, accessible ports, and agricultural 
productivity, developing it into the eighth largest economic 
engine in the world.11 
California, recognized as 
the most productive agri-
cultural state in the United 
States,12 leads the nation in 
production of various crops 
including almonds, grapes, 
and tomatoes among oth-
ers.13 All of the aforemen-
tioned resources, from gold 
to crops, require water 
extraction, transportation, 
and sustenance, making “…California’s very existence…pre-
mised on epic liberties taken with water.”14 While California’s 
precious water resources should be protected, recent events have 
shown that is not the case.
California’s water use is immense, wasteful, and, possibly 
worst of all, unmonitored.15 California, mostly a mixture of dry 
desert and Mediterranean climate, must divert approximately 
forty-three million acre-feet annually from melting snowpack 
and groundwater.16 Sixty percent of those acre-feet come from 
reservoirs and other surface waters, while forty percent comes 
from groundwater.17 Regardless of the source, an estimated 
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and, possibly worst of all, 
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eighty percent of California’s water use goes towards agricul-
ture,18 mostly in the Central Valley,19 with ten and fifteen percent 
of water devoted to the uniquely thirsty almond and alfalfa crops 
respectively, even though a great portion of both are exported.20 
Of the remaining twenty percent of the entire state’s water sup-
ply, industrial use consumes six percent, leaving fourteen per-
cent for home and governmental usage.21 Within municipalities, 
water usage is highest in wealthy neighborhoods, reaching half 
of a domestic water bill in some areas when compared to lower 
income areas.22 However, there is no accurate way to measure 
California’s overall water use as many regions, especially the 
arid Central Valley, lack water meters.23 The absence of water 
meters deprives California of the ability to monitor water use 
and increase conservation efforts when necessary.24
The massive water use coupled with little oversight is 
proving disastrous now in an ever-warming world.25 Studies 
show that “a persistent region of high atmospheric pressure 
hovering over the Pacific Ocean that diverted storms away 
from California” are causing the droughts.26 Such atmospheric 
conditions are more likely to occur today because of higher 
concentrations of tropospheric greenhouse gasses that are 
warming the atmosphere.27 Furthermore, a higher frequency 
of droughts is also likely because a warmer atmosphere holds 
more moisture than a cooler one.28, Climate change is lead-
ing to less precipitation, thus causing California’s agriculture 
to suffer, resulting in $2.2 billion in direct and indirect costs 
this year, including the loss of more than seventeen thousand 
seasonal and part-time jobs.29 Such losses have led the federal 
government to declare all fifty-eight California counties as 
“natural disaster areas.”30
California’s continuing drought from 2013 not only threat-
ens the state’s economy, but impacts residents directly.31 In the 
agricultural worker communities of southern California, particu-
larly east Porterville in Tulare County, where temperatures hover 
over one hundred degrees Fahrenheit during the summer, more 
than five hundred households “cannot flush a toilet, fill a drinking 
glass, wash dishes or clothes, or even rinse their hands without 
reaching for a bottle or bucket.”32 Meanwhile, “[g]roundwater 
levels… have plunged by sixty feet or more in some spots, and 
tens of thousands of wells are in danger.”33 Aside from the incon-
venience to California residents without water, the most recent 
drought and future droughts will continue to threaten the lives of 
agricultural workers who are influential in harvesting all of the 
aforementioned crops.34 This is not simply speculation; if people 
do not have access to water, it does not matter how much they 
are paid if they cannot work.
To combat the lack of access to water, California began reg-
ulating groundwater use35, but these efforts neglect to factor in 
the exacerbation of existing drought conditions.36 On September 
16, 2014, Governor Edmund Brown signed three bills, Assembly 
Bill 1739, and Senate Bills 1168 and 1319 to enable local agen-
cies to tailor “sustainable groundwater plans” to address specific, 
regional economic and environmental issues.37
Assembly Bill 1739 provides for the creation of 
groundwater sustainability agencies to impose f ines for 
unreasonable water use, submit groundwater sustainability 
plans to California’s Department of Water Resources (“DWR”), 
require groundwater use reporting, and grant California’s State 
Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) the authority 
to designate water basins as probationary basins if there are 
groundwater overdraft problems.38 A probationary basin desig-
nation entails an interim sustainability plan with more immedi-
ate regulatory action.39
Senate Bill 1168 grants the sustainable use of groundwater 
for both economic and environmental uses; directs the DWR to 
designate the water needs of a water basin as a high, medium, 
low, or very low priority; and requires groundwater sustainability 
plans to manage all high and medium priority basins.40 Senate 
Bill 1319 enables the SWRCB to designate high and medium 
priority basins as probationary basins if certain criteria are met 
after January 31, 2025, and removes local agencies’ authority 
to implement parts of their respective sustainability plans if the 
SWRCB determines that the current plan is adequate. If a plan is 
adequate, then a replacement interim plan to meet or help meet 
the basin’s sustainability goal is implemented.41
These newly approved bills are an improvement, but any 
benefits as a result of the legal amendments are likely to be too 
late because the local groundwater management agencies will 
not be identified until 2017. Moreover, overdrafted groundwater 
basins will not have sustainability plans until 2020; high and 
medium priority basins that are not currently overdrafted will 
not have their respective plans until 2022; and high and medium 
priority basins are not required to obtain full sustainability until 
2040.42 As these plans are developed, the western states’ water 
resources are going to be further stressed,43 and California will 
potentially face more water shortages.44 None of the bills address 
how California will mitigate the demands of vested water rights 
in the face of an ever-decreasing supply of water. Proposition 145, 
approved on November 4, 2014, may help alleviate water supply 
issues with $7.545 billion in bonds being devoted to water sup-
ply infrastructure projects; however, Proposition 1 still does not 
address the current problem of water rights being guaranteed in 
a time of drought.46
The established and newly created legal protections sur-
rounding water use are not sufficiently adaptable to the growing 
demands of climate change, and, must therefore be reconsidered 
if life in California and the western United States is to be sus-
tained. Legal protections must be rethought because the luxury 
of the status quo is lost in an ever-warming world. Therefore, 
either prior appropriation’s failures are addressed voluntarily 
now, or under duress in the future. Before postulating what addi-
tional legal mechanisms are necessary, one should understand 
how prior appropriation came to be.
III. Western Water LaW or “FIrst In tIme, 
FIrst In rIght”
Prior appropriation, the western water law regime recog-
nizing the right to divert water away from its original source, 
came about because western courts wrestled with the conflict of 
economic imperatives for growth and limited water resources.47 
162953_AU_SDLP_Fall15.indd   26 2/8/16   5:02 PM
27Fall 2015
Different western states either partially or exclusively recognize 
the doctrine, and Kansas has developed unique legal tools to 
accommodate recognized water rights in times of drought.48
A. The DevelopmenT of The prior AppropriATion 
DocTrine
The western water right doctrine that threatens California’s 
future originated when gold was discovered in the high Sierras at 
Sutter’s Mill on January 24, 1848.49 At the time the United States 
was not exercising any right over the land or water despite its 
recent purchase,50 leaving a legal vacuum wherein the customs 
of gold miners could supplant established common law.51
Under Mexican control, a communal framework adminis-
tered California’s waters.52 On the other hand, the United States 
borrowed the English Common Law riparian doctrine where the 
right to the use stayed with the land, and riparian owners have the 
right “to have a natural stream through his land continue to flow 
without diminution or alteration.”53 When California became a 
state, it adopted the riparian common law rules, but also retained 
some water law notions from Mexico.54
The legal systems conflicted with the miners, as gold min-
ing required both the personal acquisition of water for public 
use, and the diversion of water away from its natural flow.55 
Furthermore, riparian water law did not satisfy non-irrigated 
agriculture because fewer than twenty inches of rainfall fall each 
year west of the hundredth meridian.56
California’s Supreme Court wrestled with the conflict 
of law and reality.57 The Court resolved the conflict when it 
implemented the traditions of the gold miners as a model.58 
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court created the prior 
appropriation doctrine of “first in time, first in right” where one 
attains a superior right over other claimants to use water, sepa-
rate from the source, when one is first to divert the water for a 
beneficial use.59 In promoting use of water for mining purposes, 
the California Supreme Court stated “the right to appropriate 
the waters of the streams of this State, for mining and other 
purposes, has been too long settled to admit of any doubt or 
discussion at this time.”60 In siding with new customs of miners, 
the Court decided that it was “emphatically the law-makers, as 
respects mining, upon the public lands in the State.”61
Prior appropriation soon spread eastward away from 
California into the rest of the West, and numerous western states, 
including Colorado and Nebraska,62 enshrined prior appro-
priation into their constitutions.63 In contrast, states like Kansas 
opted to be guided through statutes and case law.64 The doctrine 
has consistently developed that a water right requires a diversion 
of water for a beneficial use, covering both what the water is used 
for and how much.65 Water appropriated for a non-beneficial use 
was, and still is “waste” and can be grounds for terminating a 
water right.66
Intent to divert and notice of diversion are almost de facto 
elements of any irrigation or other water works project, but 
the diversion requirement itself has largely been marginalized 
throughout the twentieth century,67 especially as in-stream ben-
eficial uses, such as fish, wildlife habitat, and recreation, became 
recognized as a collateral result of the environmental movement 
in the 1960s.68 It is generally agreed that “beneficial use, with-
out waste, is the basis, measure, and limit of a water right.”69 
Without a beneficial use, there is only waste and the resulting 
forfeiture of a water right without a beneficial use cannot reason-
ably be considered a taking.70 
It is unclear what exactly a beneficial use is because 
most western states have no statutory guidance regarding the 
requirement, leaving the beneficial use concept up to judiciary 
discretion.71 Often the result is that a beneficial use is “socially 
acceptable,” which allows industrial and exploitative uses of 
water. However, beneficial use also extends into in-stream uses 
of water and other environmental concerns.72
With beneficial use being so malleable yet crucial to water 
rights, any climate change adaptation in water law must address 
this definitional issue. Ironically, with “beneficial” being a 
subjective and inherently value-laden term, courts and legisla-
tors could have conceived ecology to be within the beneficial 
use requirement at its outset just as development is equated with 
benefit. Unlike California, which recognizes both the riparian 
and prior appropriation doctrine,73 Colorado rejects the riparian 
doctrine outright, opting to rely solely on prior appropriation.74 
This leads to a split among the western states depending on 
whether they follow California’s or Colorado’s model. However, 
beyond this dichotomy, unique water law mechanisms are 
emerging in Kansas.75
B. cAliforniA WATer lAW
California’s constitution guarantees its citizens the ability to 
appropriate water, with the appropriation guiding it in a “man-
ner prescribed by law.”76 Water use must be both reasonable and 
beneficial, and conversely there is no right to waste water unrea-
sonably or in a non-beneficial manner.77 California is also free 
to enact laws to further limit water use to beneficial purposes.78 
Thus, California’s constitution does not guarantee that one may 
always have access to water, but instead only guarantees ben-
eficial uses and directs the State to decide what distinguishes 
benefit from waste.79
In 1914, California’s SWRCB oversaw the Water 
Commission Act of 1914 establishing California’s modern water 
permit process.80 Subsequently, the Board has broad author-
ity to allocate water resources reasonably and prevent waste.81 
When approving or transferring a water right, the Board takes 
“into account all prior rights and the availability of water in the 
basin.”82 Under this review, riparian users have priority over 
prior appropriators.83 The SWRCB also considers flows neces-
sary for in-stream uses such as recreation and wildlife habitat.84 
The approval process entails the water appropriator’s application 
specifying the “proposed project’s source, place of use, purpose, 
point(s) of diversion and quantity to be diverted,” an environ-
mental review under the California Environmental Quality Act, 
a public notice and comment period, and a permit granting 
the water right.85 A quasi-governmental irrigation district then 
monitors water use.86
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California’s courts guide the state’s water use by stressing 
reasonable and beneficial purposes87, and that there is no vested 
property right to waste water unreasonably.88 California’s courts 
also recognize that the State may validly limit the property inter-
est of a water right to reasonable use, going so far as allowing 
the full deprivation of water rights.89
The state’s power is judicially sanctioned so far as to also 
apportion waters under the public trust doctrine.90 The doctrine 
says states must guarantee control and access to all its navigable 
waters and submerged lands.91 The doctrine is limited to naviga-
bility, but in California the water right approval process may also 
contemplate “commerce, fishing, recreation, or ecological use[s] 
relating to the source stream,” to ensure that new water uses do 
not interfere with the public trust or other’s lawful water rights.92 
Though the doctrine is rarely used, it can impede multi-million 
dollar water development projects if evoked.93
California recognizes waste as diverting an amount of water 
that “exceeds the amount reasonably necessary for beneficial 
purposes,” following the “general custom of the locality” as 
opposed to the “most scientific method known.”94 The standard 
of waste is biased towards finding no waste as general customs 
serve as the litmus. Appropriators need not use the best methods 
available to prevent waste.95 Instead, a party challenging a water 
right only needs to demonstrate both the technological feasibility 
of a less wasteful option and that such an amount still comports 
with local customs.96 However, courts only stop the most overly 
superfluous of water uses, as the law bends the common law to 
suit utility and custom.97
California law’s inherent bias towards the utilization of all 
water available and deference to custom makes the State’s exist-
ing legal framework inadequate in the face of climate change.98 
This is true despite a critique of California’s recent water law 
reformations.99 California’s current problems will only worsen 
as local customs summarily equate agriculture and other goals 
with beneficial use if local customs continue shaping what is 
seen as reasonable and wasteful.
Optimists may want to turn to the public trust doctrine to 
adapt to climate change, but such reliance is likely misplaced. 
Though the public trust doctrine enables the state to consider 
ecological and other holistic notions to ensure “the greatest num-
ber of beneficial users that the water supply can support,” the 
doctrine is still “subject to the rights of those with lawful priority 
to the water.”100 Even if California courts use the public trust 
doctrine to prevent further unsustainable water development, 
the doctrine fails to address vested, uneconomic and unsustain-
able water rights.101 Therefore, California must turn to solutions 
beyond its current and updated water law jurisprudence to adapt 
to ever more demanding droughts.
C. Colorado Water laW
If California’s own hybrid legal framework, combing ripar-
ian and prior appropriation, cannot enable the State to adapt to its 
current water crisis and climate change, then perhaps it should 
consider other western water law regimes. Following California’s 
water law development, the United States Congress, via the 1866 
Mining Act and 1877 Desert Lands Act, approved that states and 
territories can change their legal systems to develop unappropri-
ated water on and off the federal lands secured with the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo.102 Like California, Colorado had to resolve 
multiple conflicting water law doctrines at the time of its state-
hood.103 The conflict arose between Spanish-American settlers 
who brought their communitarian approach to water law where 
one’s right of access was qualified by the needs of others,104 and 
early Mormon settlers who hold that groups, not individuals can 
own water rights.105
The early Kansas Territorial government largely adopted 
the Spanish and Mormon water law doctrines, but conflict 
arose shortly after achieving statehood in 1861 when Colorado 
had the choice of adopting the common law riparian doctrine 
or the newly developed prior appropriation custom.106 Unlike 
California where the courts simply adopted the customs of 
industry to justify legal changes107, Colorado courts relied on 
the newly codified support for prior appropriation in Colorado’s 
constitution.108 Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court did not 
have to recognize a new legal doctrine to conclude that Colorado 
was a purely prior appropriation state.109 The irony of the 
Colorado’s Supreme Court decision did not escape the critical 
gaze of the late Joseph Sax who described the Court’s reason-
ing as nothing more than, “judicial revisionism in reading the 
Territorial legislature’s riparian statutes.”110
Regardless of the Colorado Supreme Court’s probable 
oversight, prior appropriation was readily incorporated into “the 
policy… that there should be maximum utilization of water and 
that the maximum utilization doctrine be integrated into the law 
of vested rights.”111 In 1884, just two years after the Court’s 
endorsement of the doctrine, over a million acres of Colorado 
land was irrigated due to prior appropriation’s ready ability to 
secure private property rights.112 For decades, State overseers 
relied on the words of individual appropriators to determine 
priority and the establishment of water rights leading to many 
supply problems.113 As Kansas Assistant Attorney General and 
water lawyer explains:
“Most appropriators did not know how much water 
they were diverting, how much they had even 
claimed, or how much their lands needed…. They 
had no regard whatsoever for future water needs, 
and made grossly excessive claims. They posted 
different claims of water to the same tract of land, 
either in competition with one another or by mis-
take. These errors produced a problem as old as 
prior appropriation itself: that of over-appropriation 
where the quantities set forth in decreed water rights 
vastly exceeded the supply the stream could give, 
even in wet years.”114
In response, Colorado created a system of water courts 
with the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 
1969.115 The Act divided Colorado into Divisions, wherein water 
judges and division engineers oversee the claims of potential 
appropriators and resolve disputes.116
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Today, a water right applicant provides the division’s water 
clerk with “a verified application setting forth facts supporting 
the ruling sought,” including showing all the elements of prior 
appropriation.117 Afterwards, “the appropriator can receive a 
judicially awarded final decree, with a priority backdated to the 
time the ‘first step’ was taken provided that the work toward 
appropriation continued with reasonable diligence.”118 Once 
a final decree and a continued diversion for beneficial and 
reasonable use is obtained, the appropriator acquires a vested 
right.119 An applicant can also reach the same result by acquir-
ing a conditional decree from a water court, which enables an 
appropriator to acquire a priority date on a yet to be completed 
waterworks project.120
Once such a right is acquired, Colorado’s courts rely on the 
State’s constitution to give an inordinate amount of deference 
towards protecting that right from governmental interference.121 
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that these constitutional 
provisions are meant to preserve the prior appropriation system 
rather than conserve water 
for the public or future.122
This is not to say 
that Colorado water users 
are free to act without 
any restraints. Like every 
western state, one can 
only obtain a water right 
through prior appropria-
tion if the water diverted is 
“of a specified quantity of 
water to an actual benefi-
cial use.”123 Groundwater 
is also included within the 
“beneficial” and “reason-
able” use requirements 
that must be maintained 
lest a water right be divested.124 However, it is not always 
apparent what qualifies as a beneficial use because Colorado 
lacks extensive statutory guidance.125 The State’s constitution 
does provide that domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing 
purposes are beneficial uses, but otherwise leaves the definition 
of beneficial use to court discretion.126 Storage itself is not a 
beneficial use, though subsequent usage is, and neither is an 
excessive water diversion, though that is almost by definition 
unreasonable as well.
Colorado’s water courts grant such deference to applicants 
that they rarely find a non-beneficial or unreasonable use. Water 
rights are frequently divested or limited as between complaining 
plaintiffs and defendants,127 but courts still grant water rights 
when the application is late or when collateral business docu-
ments are not properly filed.128 Interstate compacts, retroactive 
legislation, or “the uncontrolled discretion of state engineers” 
will not limit water rights in Colorado.129
It is because of Colorado’s policy of maximized water use, 
with an extreme amount of deference towards appropriators, 
that its water law provides no help to adapt to climate change 
demands.130 In Colorado, “[a] decreed priority to the use of 
water for irrigation is not only a property right, it is a free-
hold.”131 But with drought conditions throughout the West pre-
dicted to worsen, a Colorado water right will soon be a freehold 
in nothing.132 In finding categorical beneficial uses with little 
to no judicial scrutiny, Colorado’s legal regime is a race to the 
bottom, with every appropriator driving his straw down to get 
the last drop. Colorado’s current water law regime is deficient in 
the face of climate change and more adaptable methods should 
be planned.
D. Kansas Water LaW
Kansas has adopted several novel legal adaptations to 
drought that may be extendable to other western states. After 
entering statehood in 1861, Kansas adopted riparian common 
law,133 and then recognized prior appropriation via statute in 
1876.134 Thus, Kansas subscribes to the California doctrine, 
continuing to recognize the riparian doctrine alongside prior 
appropriation today.135 
State courts refused to 
solely recognize prior 
appropriation even as 
Kansas’ Division of Water 
Resources  (“DWR”) 
was forming in 1917.136 
However, after the rav-
aging Dust Bowl of the 
1930s, prior appropriation 
and deeper wells grew 
into higher esteem as 
water resources became 
more critical to economic 
security.137
The doctrine did not 
receive constitutional 
regard as it did in other 
states138, but Kansas recognized that prior appropriation was 
necessary to develop the western half of the state and accord-
ingly passed the Kansas Water Appropriation Act (“KWAA”) of 
1945, extending prior appropriation to all waters, both surface 
and groundwater.139 The KWAA also recognized water rights 
as property rights, provided the mechanism for acquiring new 
water rights, designated waters rights established by or before 
June 28, 1945 as vested rights, and granted the chief engineer the 
ultimate authority over the enforcement of rights and allocation 
of water resources “for the benefits and beneficial uses of all of 
its inhabitants,” not just water right owners.140 The 1957 KWAA 
amendments further protected interests of water appropriators 
through classification of impairment as an unreasonable interfer-
ence or degradation of the water’s quality “beyond a reasonable 
economic limit.”141
As a result of the KWAA, Kansas now administers water 
rights similarly to other western states.142 Applicants must state 
that they wish to divert water for a reasonable beneficial use 
and then have the chief engineer and Kansas’ DWR perform an 
“The Colorado Supreme 
Court has held that these 
constitutional provisions are 
meant to preserve the prior 
appropriation system rather 
than conserve water for the 
public or future.”
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inspection before a certificate guaranteeing the water right’s pri-
ority date is issued.143 Applicable beneficial uses are enumerated 
as fourteen distinct categories, most of them entailing domestic, 
irrigation, and industrial uses of water.144 When two conflicting 
appropriators have the same priority, favored beneficial uses will 
have priority.145 Today, like California, Kansas devotes eighty-
five percent of its water towards agriculture.146 However, the 
chief engineer may suspend a water right if the use becomes 
so excessive as to be unreasonable and wasteful.147 Factors 
considered when determining if a water use constitutes waste 
include, but are not limited to, minimum desirable streamflows, 
groundwater recharge rate, the priority of exiting claims, and the 
amount of each competing claim.148
Unfortunately, this legal system alone leads to frequent 
overdraw problems.149 Kansas statutes do not further define 
“beneficial use” or “waste,” and its view of impairment is rooted 
in economics as opposed to a hydrology.150 Consider all of that 
with an overzealous desire to develop the State’s water, and the 
cruel irony of the KWAA becomes apparent. The KWAA allows 
an exponential increase in the number of granted rights, 151 even 
though the law was enacted with the purpose of preventing over-
drawing of groundwater.152 Since the KWAA’s enactment, water 
right applications increased from 334 between 1945 and 1950 to 
5,730 during the 1950s, 6,433 during the 1960s, and 16,226 in 
the 1970s.153 However, none of those numbers accurately indi-
cate the amount of water the State uses, as the chief engineer 
does not need to be informed of domestic wells.154 Meanwhile, 
the Ogallala Aquifer, the main source for appropriated water in 
the State, went from three percent depletion in 1960 to thirty 
percent depletion today.155 As such, agriculture does not receive 
the majority of water appropriation, as much as it is mined,156 
with the Ogallala Aquifer predicted to be sixty nine percent 
depleted by 2060.157
In response to these depletion trends, Kansas has created 
three legal innovations, unique to western states, to address 
drought and declining water reserves.158 The first legal innova-
tion was the chief engineer’s new authority, granted in 1978, 
to designate certain areas as intensive groundwater use con-
trol areas (“IGUCA”).159 The chief engineer may establish an 
IGUCA upon his or her own volition, or under his or her discre-
tion after the requisite amount of demand within a groundwater 
management district, a multi-county governmental within the 
DWR.160 The conditions necessary for the formation of an 
IGUCA include when:
“(a) Groundwater levels in the area in question are 
declining or have declined excessively; or (b) the rate 
of withdrawal of groundwater within the area in ques-
tion equals or exceeds the rate of recharge in such 
area; or (c) preventable waste of water is occurring or 
may occur within the area in question; (d) unreason-
able deterioration of the quality of water is occurring 
or may occur within the area in question; or (e) other 
conditions exist within the area in question which 
require regulation in the public interest.”161
Eight such IGUCAs are now existent using the aforemen-
tioned basis.162 Once established, the chief engineer may pre-
empt all new water rights applications, set a permissible total 
groundwater withdrawal level, reduce the amount of permissible 
groundwater withdrawal, require a rotation in groundwater use, 
or any necessary provision to “protect the public interest.”163
Second, in 1991 the Kansas Legislature granted the chief 
engineer the authority to require water right applicants to for-
mulate a conservation plan to preserve water resources.164 Such 
authority is discretionary, and can only be evoked if there is a 
finding that the conservation plan will “assure public benefit and 
promote public interest.”165
Third, and most recently in 2012, the Kansas Legislature 
enabled local communities to establish stricter water use stan-
dards in Local Enhanced Management Areas (“LEMA”).166 
Whenever an area within a groundwater management district is 
designated as an IGUCA, community members, who presum-
ably realize that their unregulated actions threaten the common 
groundwater resource, may restrict their water rights within fur-
ther circumscribed areas in the IGUCA. Entering into a LEMA 
is completely voluntary, and subject to the chief engineer’s 
approval.167
All of Kansas’ efforts to adapt to drought and dwindling 
resources are commendable, but likely will be insufficient in 
light of climate change. IGUCAs allow established, yet still 
unsustainable, agricultural practices to continue, never ques-
tioning if water usage is truly beneficial if it is being applied to 
thirsty corn.168 Enabling the chief engineer to require conserva-
tion plans likewise sounds promising, but being subject to the 
complete discretion of the chief engineer makes the measure 
almost meaningless when the chief engineer’s discretion is 
biased through the long standing myth that western water use 
can and should be maximized. Personal views also undermine 
the LEMA efforts, for as long as they entirely voluntary then it 
will always be immediately more economical for an individual 
appropriator to continue drilling, rather than limit his or her own 
use with the hope that neighbors will do likewise.169
With recent legal adaptations to drought being lackluster, 
the inherent problems with prior appropriation are not addressed. 
Beneficial use in Kansas is still categorically defined, waste is 
practically undefined as unreasonable as measured by custom, 
and water rights still implicitly assume that a finite resource can 
be extracted ad infinitum. Current Kansas political leadership is 
unlike to address a response to any of those problems in prior 
appropriation are not as it is now legitimately considering the 
construction of an aqueduct, bringing the Missouri River to 
Dodge City170 despite the legal and technical infeasibility of 
such an endeavor.171 Therefore, none of the currently existing 
models of water law can remedy California’s water woes, in of 
themselves. Instead, the problems inherent in prior appropriation 
must be addressed to adapt to climate change, and new legal 
approaches should be considered.
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IV. A ClImAte ChAnge AdAptIVe WAter lAW
Prior appropriation developed not as a logical extension of 
established common law, but as a discrete, unprecedented inci-
dent to accommodate the needs and desires of early California 
miners and farmers.172 As such, prior appropriation implicitly 
assumed that water could be utilized like any hard or soft rock 
mineral, with extraction levels remaining relatively constant. 
This system of water allocation may have seemed appropri-
ate from the latter half of the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth as the population of western U.S. cities exploded173; 
however, with the circumstances surrounding climate change 
becoming grimmer.
It is clear that prior appropriation relies on false assump-
tions when the circumstances surrounding climate change 
become grimmer. It is reasonable to foresee more climate change 
induced drought, which will increasingly stress a resource that is 
consistently dropping in supply.174 As there are no expectations 
that the West’s water supply will increase, water supply, agri-
cultural productivity, and 
other economic endeavors, 
are inversely related and 
antagonistic towards each 
other.175 Thus prior appro-
priation, which enables 
resource exploitation 
based on temporal priority, 
is doomed to drain what 
water remains.176
Prior appropriation 
must adapt if life, not just 
agriculture, in the western 
United States is to be 
sustained. Expanding the 
legal conceptions of beneficial use from a categorical, individual 
viewpoint to a more societal, ecological one will help make this 
trend occur.
A. AdApting prior AppropriAtion
Case law and precedent supports the changing the nature of 
the beneficial use element of prior appropriation.177 As long as a 
water right is reasonably utilized for a statutorily approved, judi-
cially sanctioned, or constitutionally protected use, then the use 
is not waste178, and the water right is not subject to forfeiture.179 
The amount of water diverted must still be reasonable, but the 
reasonableness of a water project’s use is not judged.
Extremely water intensive agricultural projects can continue 
because they are agricultural. Prior appropriation’s shortsighted-
ness is not surprising, considering that the doctrine was designed 
to do nothing more guarantee property rights with maximal 
water use.180 Such certainty is no longer possible in a chang-
ing climate. One need only look at California’s current drought 
to understand the prior appropriation doctrine’s inflexibility to 
satisfy climate change’s ecological demands.181
Despite prior appropriation’s inherent problems, it is 
important to note that the California Supreme Court justifies 
the curtailment of water rights because, “the protection and 
conservation of the natural resources of the state [is] in the gen-
eral welfare and serve[s] a public purpose, and so constitute[s] 
a reasonable exercise of the police power.”182 Relying on that 
justification, a California appellate court reasons that, “a diver-
sion of water may be for a purpose ‘beneficial’ in some respect 
. . . does not make such use ‘reasonable’ when compared with 
demands, or even future demands, for more important uses.”183 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit Appellate Court agrees that the 
“beneficial use [requirement] expresses a dynamic concept, 
which is a ‘variable according to conditions’, and therefore 
over time.”184 Even the Idaho Supreme Court recognizes that 
“conditions might so change that [previously acceptable uses] 
would be an unjustifiable use of water needed for other pur-
poses.”185 Thus, the concept of beneficial need not be limited 
to the status quo.
The fluid nature of beneficial use should not be controver-
sial. Prior appropriation was itself a seemingly unprecedented 
legal change that was nec-
essary at the time.186 Both 
the benef icial use and 
waste doctrines of water 
law have even changed 
over time, f inding new 
uses of water not to be 
waste as the new methods 
became accepted over 
time.187 Similar to how 
the “the morality of an act 
is a function of the state of 
the system at the time it 
is performed,” the reason-
ableness, wastefulness, or 
benefit of a water project 
cannot be measured unconditionally.188 Rather, the water right 
approval process can and should consider that water projects 
that were once beneficial may no longer be so today.
This view of beneficial use envisions no categorical defini-
tions of beneficial uses. Beneficial use should instead “weigh 
relative values and priorities.”189 Accordingly, agricultural, 
industrial, and similar water uses are not treated as de facto 
beneficial. Instead, individual state statutes may direct state engi-
neers and agencies to consider future water needs before deem-
ing a use beneficial and entitled to a water right. State courts may 
also act by finding proposed and current water usages wasteful, 
just as the courts recognized that once non-beneficial uses could 
become beneficial.190
State statutes could also entail ranking certain crops, pro-
viding deference to more water efficient crops, and designating 
other crops as wasteful based on the state where appropriators 
wish to grow them. For example, corn in western Kansas may 
be unreasonable in a drought, while wheat production may be 
beneficial.191 In California, some crop productions may never 
again be considered beneficial as the effects of climate change 
worsen.192 Since “the right to water in the West is premised upon 
“It is clear that prior 
appropriation relies on  
false assumptions when  
the circumstances 
surrounding climate change 
become grimmer.”
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use,” then already established, and unsustainable, water rights 
may be rightfully forfeited once the water use is deemed to be no 
longer beneficial.193
Western states should adopt this more holistic consider-
ation of beneficial use. California’s constitution allows for 
water rights to be circumscribed by statute, and California’s 
courts recognize that beneficial use need not be a static 
trait.194 Idaho,195 Washington,196 Montana,197 New Mexico,198 
Wyoming,199 North Dakota,200 South Dakota,201 and 
Nebraska202 are similarly situated, and thus can likewise adopt 
a context specific concept of beneficial use. In Kansas there 
is no reason to believe that beneficial use could not be further 
redefined because water rights therein have repeatedly been 
restricted by statute.203 For the same reason, a context specific 
beneficial use doctrine should be applicable in Oregon,204 
Nevada,205 Utah,206 and Oklahoma.207 Of course, there are 
limitations to this argument.
B. ImpedIments to AdAptAtIon
Impediments to adaptations will come from takings claims, 
the particularities of individual states, and the subjective nature 
of the word “beneficial.” As water rights are property rights, any 
infringement is likely to 
run against takings claims 
arguments.208 Wielding 
the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, pro-
testers are likely to claim 
that changing the concep-
tion of beneficial use will 
result in property takings 
without just compensa-
tion.209 However, any such 
takings claims in retalia-
tion of the new beneficial 
use criteria are more than 
likely to fail.210
Changing the meaning of beneficial use is not likely to 
violate the first per se taking example, as a water right is not a 
property interest in the water itself.211 Instead, a water right is 
a usufructuary right, entitling only the right to access a certain 
amount of water.212 As the first per se taking involves the state 
occupying a physical property interest, not usufructuary, this 
analysis is inapplicable.213 This result is true also for the second 
per se taking example of deprivation of economic value.214
To determine whether a diminution of economic value is a 
per se taking, a court must also balance the economic impact 
of the regulation on the property owner, the government’s inter-
ference in the property owner’s expectations, and the reasoning 
behind the regulation.215 However, this analysis is tailored by 
an “extremely deferential” view in favor of the governmental 
action.216 As long as there is a reasonable basis for the regula-
tion, it is likely to be sustained. As changing the nature of benefi-
cial use most definitely has a reasonable basis, it will not be seen 
as a taking per se.
Regarding the final form of a takings claim, undue total for-
feiture is found when all economically beneficial use of a prop-
erty interest is extinguished as a result of governmental action. A 
regulation or other enactment with such an effect can survive the 
total forfeiture analysis “only if the logically antecedent inquiry 
into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed 
use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”217 The 
governmental limitation “must inhere in the title itself,” being 
a mere extension of already existing limitations in the property 
interest in question and established property law.218
Though altering beneficial use may manifest as new leg-
islation or state constitutional decree, such changes are still 
a logical extension of the reason behind the beneficial use 
requirement. Furthermore, the beneficial use requirement is 
inherent in a water right’s title and within the background of 
every western state’s property jurisprudence.219 Therefore, the 
creation of a climate adaptive prior appropriation scheme, even 
when it restrains “pre-existing uses of rights that were legal 
when initiated,” should not constitute an unconstitutional tak-
ing in any sense.220
As for the particularities of individual states, a re-envisioned 
beneficial use requirement will not likely be implemented in 
Colorado, Arizona, and 
Texas. Colorado’s water 
law jurisprudence is so 
deferential to appropria-
tors that any new restric-
tions on obtaining water 
rights will first have to 
address the state’s constitu-
tion.221 This is also true for 
Arizona, since the Arizona 
Supreme Court found the 
retroactivity of a beneficial 
use statute upon vested 
water rights unconstitutional.222 Texas provides additional and 
unique challenges because, even if the climate change adaptive 
beneficial use doctrine was adopted, the State applies the rule 
of capture to groundwater while wholly ignoring the reasonable 
use doctrine.223 Thus, to adopt a holistic beneficial use to save 
groundwater during drought, Texas will have to statutorily abro-
gate its history of treating water like oil and gas224.
Finally, the last foreseeable legal impediment to adapting 
the western water right regime for a warming climate is the 
subjective nature of the word “beneficial” itself. Even if water 
law statutes across the West are accordingly amended, state 
water courts and agencies may still further the implicit bias 
of progress within natural resources law. Though flood irriga-
tion, or luxury crops, in a drought may not seem beneficial to 
an environmentalist, they still are to administrative agencies. 
Therefore, these conflicting views may lead to implementation 
problems within individual states, and eventually inconsisten-
cies among western states.
However, such problems can be remedied by articulate 
drafting that demonstrates what “beneficial use” is meant to 
“If the western model  
rights model does not 
voluntarily change now,  
it will have to be coerced  
to do so in the future.”
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further: the survival of western water resources. Courts may 
aid in this matter by rightfully construing prior appropriation 
statutes in line with long standing precedent that “beneficial 
use” need not be a categorical attribute.225 The fact that climate 
change is drastically reducing the availability of water resources 
makes any conflicting views on beneficial use irrelevant. If the 
western model rights model does not voluntarily change now, it 
will have to be coerced to do so in the future.
V. ConClusion
Prior appropriation may have built the West, but prior appro-
priation’s success relies upon a constant climate, an assumption 
that is no longer reasonable. The late economist Garrett Hardin 
lamented that “[t]he law, always behind the times, requires elabo-
rate stitching and fitting to adapt it to this newly perceived aspect 
of the commons.”226 Here, to preserve the commons of water 
and agriculture in America’s west, prior appropriation must be 
“stitched” to adapt to climate change. California’s current legal 
structure is promising, but the existence of California’s current 
drought problems exemplifies how the current state of the law is 
insufficient. Also, California’s recently enacted amendments will 
take too long to implement and do not speak to the issue of satis-
fying vested water right demands as the water supply is continu-
ally depleted. Colorado’s water law regime of prior appropriation 
is also not likely to assist the rest of the West considering its 
extremely deferential stance towards maximized appropriation. 
As for Kansas, its efforts should be commended, but is unlikely 
to produce substantially better results because water rationing 
remains voluntary and the State believes that continuous growth 
is possible.
Instead, California, and the rest of the West, can readily 
adapt to climate change by utilizing an equally adjustable defi-
nition of beneficial use. This new vision of beneficial use will 
encompass environmental factors and the sustained continuation 
of state economies, not just what the water is used for and how 
much water is used. Thus, the water rights that vest outmoded 
and unnecessary water projects will be lost to make room for 
new diversions.
A climate adaptive beneficial use requirement can be 
adopted easily via statute in California and other states that 
shape the guarantees of prior appropriation with statutes and 
judicial oversight. However, such a solution is not likely to 
work in Colorado, where its water court system seemingly 
demands that water reserves be drained; Arizona, where the 
State’s Supreme Court has strictly interpreted Arizona’s author-
ity over established water rights; and Texas, which applies the 
rule of capture to ground water. It is improbable that creating 
a more holistic beneficial use element will be free of imple-
mentation inconstancies as “[t]he irrigation lobby still has a 
few things going for it, mainly sentimentality, tradition, and 
law.”227 Thus, subjective biases will always determine what is 
considered a beneficial use.
Nonetheless, the legal conception of beneficial use must 
change, not “should.” The West simply does not have enough 
water to maintain constant economic growth and to keep farm-
worker communities alive.228 Climate change will foreseeably 
deprive California’s Central Valley, the United States’ hearth of 
agriculture, of one of life’s most basic necessities.229 In a way, 
this will be a fitting end; prior appropriation, at least as it con-
ceived today, may begin to die in the state where it was errati-
cally conceived. 
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